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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's "Statement of the Facts" is substantially correct 
as to the facts stated therein, but defendants wish to make the 
following additions and modifications to such facts: 
Mr. Thompson, the manager, took Mr. Jensen over the entire 
job and explained what was to be done in each area. (R.16) The 
manager directed other employees who were installing accoustic tile 
as to what was to be done. (R.17) Jensen was requested by Thompson 
to do some patching and texturing if he was capable of matching the 
color. (R.16) Thompson asked Jensen to get some accoustic tile 
for a ceiling. (R.17) The accoustic tile was being installed by 
plaintiff's employees. (R.17) Repairing of structural damage, 
taking care of the leaks, and general light construction was 
being performed all over the building. (R.37,38) Plaintiffs 
employed three handymen and a maintenance man. (R.45) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WORK DONE BY APPLICANT WAS IN FACT WORK PERFOR-
MED IN THE USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS CARRIED ON BY 
RUSTLER LODGE AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 35-1-42, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
As stated by counsel for plaintiff's, "The facts of this 
case are not really questioned by either side". The issue is 
basically how these agreed facts are applied to the above 
mentioned statute. 
Section 35-1-42(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides in 
part; 
M
....Where any employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose 
work he retains supervision or control and such work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and 
all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed 
by any such subcontractor, shall be deemed, within the 
meaning of this section, employees of such original 
employer...." (Underscoring added) 
The problem narrows itself to whether or not there are suf-
ficient facts upon which the Commission based a decision that the 
sheetrock work was a "part or process in the trade or business 
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of the employer. i i especf *:nH submitted that there Is 
more than sufficient evidence t •> supper'1; such a fincing. 
The administrative law jucj- *: ". - denied the 
claim jfi Air. A i Luund specifically in his finding number 4. 
"The o.odge regularly employs a dining room stall, j.'impx*] *,< " f 
bus boys, waitress::-, cc-.- -^washers, etc. and it employs 
thr?e handy men and a maintenance man " 'R.54) Furtnei 
finding number 11 he state- • * »ac sheetrock repairs 
--• - - : s is not par*- of ;;he regular business of 
Rustler Lod-e sc iar as hospitality serv_--r ncernpd, 
but it is nevertheless an ancillary activity common to most any 
business•" (R.55) (Underscoring added) 
The uncontradicted testimony ol . Anspn, t:hat " light construc-
; •- . --* • ~* / IT performed a^l ;ver the bu-ldmc" f- . _e) 
cy young people adir :etedi ; eiu^^jyec .i A..= ...-. _, ' The 
purchase ......... 3f accoustic tile by Rustler Lodge 
(R.I7, ill. tended tj sr.c« the extensive nature 
project unae rt—_*-
: u o t : ~ T f ron L a r s c r • w,rkr?.ens C o m p e n s a t i o n Law a t g -i I] 
app e a r s t h e i _• 11:, A ...., g a: • , - t ! » i rj u e s t i o n o f emp 1 oyme n t 
statu;-!-
:
 "
n
:t^  closest, the most, cc-ntiuvei JJ.CU *:C i.:ie most 
numerous cases on status are those involving services, such 
as repair, maintenance, and incidental construct : :-r :r 
installation, that are not ir. th ? everyday rnaxnstrear :z 
production activity. The jobs involved range all the way 
from single nonrecurring projects to regularly recurring 
tasks requiring a large fraction of the workers time. The 
workers range from individuals doing odd jobs in their 
spare time to established businesses with many employees 
and customers. The employments include window washers, 
welders, well cleaners, watchmen, house detectives, 
steeple-jacks, roofers, plumbers, plasterers, painters, 
mechanics, machinists, engineers, electricians, carpenters, 
masons, boiler repairmen, blacksmiths and repairmen of 
all kinds. 
The two poles between which the area of controversy 
lies are these: First, it must be conceded that, in an 
ordinary industrial operation, the maintenance and repair 
of the plant are an integral part of the business....At 
the opposite extreme it must also be conceded that every 
businessman cannot be held to be the direct employer of 
every plumber, electrician or painter that he might call 
in to do necessary work on the premises. 
The problem is to draw the line." 
The traditional method has been to draw the line based upon 
the element of supervision, direction or control over the parti-
cular individual. As Larson says: "The independence of these 
artisans is not to be determined by looking at the artisan or 
job alone, but by judging how independent, separate, and public 
his business service is in relation to a particular employer." 
(supra) 
Viewed in this light it appears that under the theory of 
ancillary services of this employer, ie. maintenance of his 
building and property, Jensen was in fact engaged in the same 
work as the employer and "such work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer." It was a fact that maintenance 
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was the service performed by Jensen and maintenance was a 
service being actively performed by other employees of this same 
employer. • • 
Iri
 Sommerville v. Industrial Commission 118 U. 504,1 96 
P 2 d ' I d , ( i 'J 4 :J I L h i s court r e so 1 ved the que s t io n o £ s t at u s by 
declaring it to be a jurisdictional question. The court said 
I n part, 
"The question of whether or not one engaged ii i a 
service for another is an employee or an independent 
contractor, within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, is a juriadictional question, presenting 
a situation which requires this con rt to determine the 
status from the facts submitted, by a preponderance of the 
evidence. But where, as here, the evidence in the case 
is largely uncontradicted, the problem, i s not so much one 
of examining the record to determine whether the evidence 
preponderates for or against the conclusion of the Commis-
sion, but rather of determining whether the Commission 
drew the correct legal conclusion therefrom.." 
Unlike counsel for plaintiffs
 # the principal enunciated 
by the court is true - status is a jurisdictional question 
resolved by applying the facts to the applicable law - but 
the fact \ " i Uommervi.il v.-, i
 M^ i ui;v . • 1. r. ci r L '£ A ± si i IHJUI ^ liable 
from the instant case. 
Ii I Sommer v ille, si ipi: a , i: I ::> e ;/:i dence ; » as available that 
defendant was engaged in maintenance and repair activities, no 
evidence was available that the coffee shop operated by defendants 
was the subject of the ma intenance a nd r apa :i r k i i t a bi :i :i 1 d:i ng 
separate and d istinct from the employer, no evidence was available 
that defendant participated and supervised the details of the 
maintenance activity. No other employees of the employer were 
engaged in maintenance activities. For these reasons alone 
there is sufficient distinction on the facts without detailing all 
of the differences. 
In Anderson v Last Chance Ranch Co./ 63 U. 551,228 P. 184, 
(1924) the nature of the business arose as an issue because at 
the statutory exclusion of agricultural employees. Section 35-1-4, 
(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part: 
"The words 'employee', 'workmen' and 'operative', 
as used in this title shall be construed to mean: 
(2) Every person, except agricultural laborers 
and domestic servants, in the service of any 'employer1 
as defined in subdivision (2) of section 35-1-42 who 
employes one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
in the same business...." 
The court in construing the above section was only concerned 
about the "general business of the employer". The court held 
that the "ranch company" was engaged in agricultural pursuits 
and not building construction. The effect of the finding was to 
establish that the "employer" was in fact not a covered employer 
under the act and the claim of the employee failed. 
The claim failed - not because the employee was in a 
different status from that of the employer. The claim failed 
because the employer was excluded from required coverage because 
the employer was engaged in agricultural pursuit. 
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It appears that this case actually presents an argument 
in favor of defendants since the court applied a broader rule 
about status and said: 
11
 In a narrow and restricted view of the transaction, 
plaintiff at the very moment of his injury was an agricul-
tural laborer....In the broader sense he was a carpenter's 
helper...We are not inclined to dispose of the case upon 
the narrow view above referred to". Anderson v Last Chance 
Ranch, supra. 
The court then proceeded to find - on the broader view -
that the employer was basically agricultural and not subject 
to the act. 
Suffice it to say that the activity engaged in by Jensen 
was a part or process of the trade or business of Rustler Lodge. 
Maintenance and repair constituted a substantial partion of 
this employer's business at the time of the accident. Jensen 
was engaged in maintenance and repair of that business. 
POINT II 
THE LODGE DID SUPERVISE OR HAD THE RIGHT TO SUPER-
VISE THE WORK OF JENSEN. 
It is well settled in this state that the status of an 
employee is essentially determined by either the supervision 
in fact of the details of the work of the employee or the 
right to exercise such supervision. 
In the Sommerville case, supra, the court held: 
11
 It is now well settled in the jurisdiction that 
the crucial factor in determining whether an applicant 
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for workmen's compensation is an employee or an independent 
contractor is whether or not the person for whom the 
services were performed had the right to control the 
execution of the work." 
With this general statement, the plaintiff then proceeds to 
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 220. The administrative 
law judge proceeded on the same basis and listed nine separate 
tests the Restatement uses to establish the distinction between 
servant and independent contractor. 
This court has already stated the "crucial factor" in deter-
mining the status is "whether or not the person for whom the 
services were performed had the right to control the execution 
of the work." Sommerville, supra. 
Let us here review the facts on the element of control. 
Thompson took Jensen over the entire job and explained what 
was to be done in each area. (R.16) Jensen was directed to 
obtain accoustic tile. (R.18) On his first appearance for work 
Jensen was told he could not work. (R20) Employer told Jensen 
where to stack the sheetrock. Jensen was directed to use care 
and protect the floor. (R21) Texturing and matching was dis-
cussed by Thompson. (R.16) Rate of pay was set by owner. (R.22) 
Ladders were supplied by lodge. (R.31) What more need be said 
on the elements of control.in fact, without discussing the right 
to control. 
In Plewe Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 U. 2d 
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223, 364 P.2d 1020 the matter of control by a general contractor 
over a subcontractor was discussed at length. In that case a 
roofing contractor employed shinglers and paid them by the 
square to install a roof on a building erected by the general 
contractor. An employee of the roofing contractor was hurt. 
The roofing contractor had no insurance but Plewe, the general 
contractor did. Plewe1s control consisted of advising the 
roofers to lay the shingles straight and use a chalk line. The 
court held that Plewe exercised sufficient control over the work 
to find that the employees of the subcontractor were statutory 
employees of Plewe and entitled to benefits. 
In a more recent case this court again spelled out the 
criteria to use in arriving at this nebulous thing called control 
or right to control. In Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm. 538 P.2d 316 this court said: 
"This is one of the frequently encountered cases 
which justifies the view taken by the commission that the 
employer wanted the 'best of two worlds1. On the one hand, 
to have a person rendering the service over whom he can 
maintain a high degree of control; and at the same time 
give the person the status of an independent contractor 
to avoid the responsibilities he would have to an employee. 
The trouble arises when an employee is injured he wants 
to be classified as an employee and get workmen1s compensa-
tion. 
In determining whether the statutory requirements 
are met, the courts have considered numerous factors 
relating to the employer-employee relationship, and have 
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pointed out that none of them considered alone is completely 
controlling, but that they all should be considered together 
in determining whether the requirements of the statute are 
met. 
Speaking in generality; An employee is one who is 
hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to 
perform the employer's work as directed by the employer 
and who is subject to a comparatively high degree of 
control in performing those duties. In contrast, an 
independent contractor is one who is engaged to do some 
particular project or piece of work, usually for a set 
sum, who may do the job his own way, subject to only 
minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only 
for its satisfactory completion. 
The main facts to be considered on the relationship 
here are: (1) whatever covenants or agreements exist 
concerning the right of direction and control over the 
employee, whether express or implied; (2) the right to 
hire and fire; (3) the method of payment, i.e. whether in 
wages or fees as compared to payment for a complete job 
or project; and (4) the furnishing of the equipment." 
I submit that if the facts in this case are measured against 
the standards set forth in the Young case above, the finding of 
the employer-employee relationship is the proper finding in 
this case. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING JENSEN IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE BUT AN INDE-
PENDENT CONTRACTOR, JENSEN IS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE 
UNDER THE TERMS OF SECTION 35-1-42(2) UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Section 35-1-42(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is quoted 
above under Point I. The significance of the quoted section 
establishes the fact that even a wholly independent contractor 
may still be considered an employee of the employer if the 
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employer "retains supervision or control and such work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of the employer." 
The question of the "work as a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer" was thoroughly discussed in 
Point I above. The question of status was reviewed in Point II 
along with the exercise of control. 
For purposes of argument we now assume that Jensen was in 
fact an independent contractor as claimed by plaintiffs. Does 
this status preclude him from benefits? It is respectfully 
submitted that it does not. 
In the Plewe Construction Co. case, supra, a statutory 
employee was created. The roofing contractor in that case was 
truly independent. However, Plewe exercised some minimal control 
and such minimal control was sufficient to create the statutory 
employee. 
This court has held in a number of cases involving third 
party liability under the workmen's compensation act that sub-
contractors and employees of subcontractors are precluded from 
sueing other subcontractors or general contractors in tort be-
cause all are considered to be in the same employment. See 
Galleqos v. Strinqham, 20 U. 2d 139,442 P.2d 31; Smith v. Alfred 
Brown Co., 27 U.2d 155,493 P.2d 994. All of the decisions in this 
area are essentially based upon the proposition that all the 
individuals involved are in "the same employment." 
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Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in 
part: 
"When any injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this title shall have been caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the same 
employment, the injured employee...may have an action 
for damages against such third person..." (Underscoring 
added) 
In all the decision construing this section, the exclusion 
was extended more broadly than one would normally expect in 
holding all parties to be in the same employment. In some 
cases little or no evidence of control was maintained by the 
general contractor. In fact, in suits between subcontractors 
employes none existed. 
If Jensen were to sue in tort for the negligence of Rustler 
Lodge, rest assured that the defense would be "same employment" 
effectively preventing Jensen from any remedy. 
In the Gallegos case, supra, the Smith case, supra, Peterson 
v. Fowler, 27 U. 2d 159, 493 P. 2d 997; Adamson v. Okland Constru-
ction Co. 29 U.2d 286,508 P., 2d 805 the control exercised by the 
employer was minimal at best. But in all cases, the parties 
were all found to be in the same employment. 
The element of being engaged in the same type of work is 
clearly present. The element of control - to whatever degree 
one wants to find - is present. The status of Jensen as an 
independent contractor can be inferred. The ultimate fact appears 
-12-
that Jensen is either a direct employee of Rustler Lodge or a 
statutory employee of Rustler Lodge. He must be one or the 
other• 
CONCLUSION 
By careful analysis of the facts as determined by the 
Industrial Commission and weighing them against the statute, 
the conclusion reached by the Commission is inescapable. Jensen 
was an employee of Rustler - either direct or statutory. The 
Commission reached a proper result in applying those facts 
against the appropriate law. Such decision should be affirmed. 
DATED, this day of October, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
543 East 5th South #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Attorney General 
Utah State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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